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1. Introduction 
The creation of the European Central Bank (ECB), followed by the start of European 
Monetary Union (EMU), resulted in a historic transfer of responsibility for monetary policy 
from  many  central  banks  to  a  single  supra-national  authority.  The  creation  of  a  single 
monetary policy took place at a time when central banks were becoming increasingly pre-
occupied with the behavior of financial asset prices. 
It is unlikely that all economic shocks had the same impact in each of the prospective 
euro area member states before, or even after, EMU. Moreover, at least until the end of 1998, 
it is likely that these shocks might have elicited different monetary policy responses. The 
behavior of short-term interest rates around 1999 reveals that while convergence in interest 
rates  took  place,  it  only  becomes  visually  apparent  the  year  before  the  ECB  took  over 
responsibility for monetary policy in the euro area. Prior to that time, interest rate spreads are 
sizeable and variable. Even if interest rate convergence is assumed to have taken place, there 
is  still  considerable  inflation  divergence  (e.g.,  Busetti  et  al.  2006).  This  may  create 
difficulties in the long-run for a common currency area and complicate the implementation of 
a single monetary policy. 
It is now standard practice to evaluate monetary policy based on Taylor rules, a device 
that  explains  central  banks’  reactions  to  inflation  and  the  output  gap.  Whereas  inflation 
performance used to be interpreted through the behavior of consumer prices alone, more 
questions are being asked about whether asset prices may indirectly have also played a role 
in the conduct of monetary policy (e.g., Bernanke 2004, European Central Bank 2001, 2005).   3
Yet, central bankers are also unsure about how much, if any, information is contained in asset 
prices beyond that which can be derived from the past history of inflation and output.
1 
It is unclear whether monetary authorities worry over perceived excesses in asset prices 
relative  to  some  equilibrium  or  fundamental  value,  as  opposed  to  their  volatility.  The 
transition to EMU may also have prompted some of the candidate national central banks to 
voice  concerns  over  specific  asset  prices,  depending  on  their  perceived  importance  in 
potentially  influencing  inflation  or  output  growth  in  their  respective  national  economies. 
Consequently, whereas real exchange rate considerations may have mattered relatively more 
in the conduct of monetary policy for some countries, housing or equity price developments 
likely loomed larger in others. 
Not to be forgotten is the role of monetary aggregates. The ECB has been criticized for 
its emphasis on ‘money’, as part of its two pillars strategy of monetary policy (e.g., Gerlach 
and Svensson 2003, but see Scheller 2004). However, a long-run view of the role of money 
as a determinant of inflation might wish to treat money seriously (von Hagen and Hofmann 
                                                 
1 Bernanke (2005) suggests that “Central bankers naturally play close attention to interest 
rates and asset prices, … [they] are potentially valuable sources of timely information about 
economic  and  financial  conditions  …  [and]  should  embody  a  great  deal  of  investors’ 
collective information and beliefs about the future course of the economy.” Others, including 
Alan  Greenspan,  have  suggested  either  that  asset  prices  have  only  an  indirect  effect  on 
interest rates or were largely ignored in the past (Norris 2005). Greithner (2006), President of 
the New York Fed, is somewhat more emphatic about the role of asset prices in monetary 
policy:  “…  monetary  policy  still  has  to  take  into  account  the  impact  of  significant 
movements in asset values on output and inflation.”   4
2007).  Indeed,  evincing  a  concern  for other  types  of asset  prices  could signal  a form of 
“tunnel vision” in the conduct of monetary policy (European Central Bank 2005). The best 
that can be said then about the link between asset prices and interest rates is that central 
bankers are conflicted about their role in influencing policy.
2 In any event, whether asset 
price developments play a role in interest rate developments in the euro area prior to and 
since  the  creation  of  the  ECB  is  an  empirical  question.  In  this  paper,  we  are  primarily 
interested in the indicator properties of different asset prices. 
It is widely assumed that policy-making is forward-looking. Depending on the form of 
the  reaction  function,  this  requires  variables  that  are  unobservable.  Current  best  practice 
involves estimating forward-looking Taylor rules using instrumental variables approaches. 
Our approach asks whether asset prices are relevant instruments in an econometric sense. 
Currently, relatively little attention is paid to choosing instruments, and still less whether 
they are statistically relevant in an estimated reaction function. We are the first to report a 
series of instrument relevance tests for monetary policy rules, and the results shed light on 
the potential dissimilar concerns faced by euro area central banks prior to EMU.
3 Hence, 
                                                 
2 “It is far from obvious that bubbles, even if identified early, can be preempted at a lower 
cost than a substantial economic contraction and possible financial destabilization – the very 
outcomes  we  would  be  seeking  to  avoid.”  (Greenspan  2004).  Gruen,  Plumb,  and  Stone 
(2005) show that the informational requirements needed to support an activist response to 
asset price bubbles are quite substantial. 
3 We are not, of course, the first or the only authors of a study to consider asset prices as 
instruments. For example, see Chadha, Sarno, and Valente (2004).   5
while estimated rules may look alike across the countries considered, the information sets 
that produce the seemingly comparable outcomes differ. 
An alternative approach asks how central banks set interest rates in response to forecasts 
published by private and public agencies, other than central banks themselves. These are 
viewed  as  proxies  for  central  bank  forecasts.  Such  forecasts,  at  least  indirectly,  may 
incorporate  asset  price  developments  if  they  are  indicators  of  future  inflation  and  output 
developments  (e.g.,  Svensson  2003).  There  have  been  comparatively  fewer  attempts  to 
estimate, and empirically evaluate, forecast-based Taylor rules. Since forward-looking and 
forecast-based policy rules are non-nested hypotheses of interest rate determination, we also 
report  encompassing  tests  to  decide  whether  one  type  of  rule  is  capable  of  statistically 
dominating the other. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next two sections discuss the potential role of 
asset prices as indicators of monetary policy actions as well as the estimation and testing 
strategy. We then report estimates of forward-looking and forecast-based Taylor rules for 
three core euro area countries, namely France, Germany, and Italy.
4 The paper concludes 
with a summary and conclusions are drawn. 
Briefly, adding assets prices as instruments in forward-looking Taylor rules produces not 
only more plausible reaction functions but ones that achieve a better fit. However, the asset 
                                                 
4 Policy rules for smaller euro area members including Austria, Belgium, Finland, and the 
Netherlands were also examined. As these did not materially affect the conclusions reported 
below, we do not discuss them any further. Also see Eleftheriou, Gerdesmeier, and Roffia 
(2006). The real GDP of the three core area countries considered in this paper accounts for 
roughly three-quarters of euro area-wide real GDP.   6
price found to be most relevant in a statistical sense differs across the countries considered. 
For example, a monetary aggregate usually performs well for most countries considered but 
estimates  can  be improved by taking into account equity or housing prices. We interpret 
these results to mean that asset price developments influenced expectations of inflation and 
the output gap in core euro area countries. However, as different asset prices appeared to 
influence monetary policy setting behavior in individual euro area countries this could be 
construed  as  complicating  the  task  of  the  ECB.  Finally,  forecast-based  Taylor  rules 
encompass forward-looking Taylor rules in each country, as well as for the euro area as a 
whole.  A  policy  implication  is  that  central  banks  that  possibly  have  some  comparative 
informational and technical advantage in the production of such forecasts, should routinely 
make such forecasts publicly available.
5 
2. Asset Prices as Indicators in Taylor Rules 
While tradition, and a considerable amount of empirical evidence, points to inflation, 
output, and a desire to minimize interest rate volatility as chief among the concerns of most 
central banks (e.g., Favero and Rovelli 2003, but see Rudebusch 2002 and Lansing 2002), 
recent events have prompted some researchers to consider the possibility that asset prices 
                                                 
5 Since 2003, the ECB publishes the Survey of Professional Forecasters (http://www.ecb.int/ 
stats/spf). The data only go back to 1999. Note that these are not the ECB’s forecasts. When 
using central bank forecasts there is potentially an additional complication for the consumers 
of such forecasts (Goodhart 2005). Also published semi-annually are the Eurosystem staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro are (http://www.ecb.int.mopo/html/index.en.html).    7
also play a role in a policy reaction function.
6 Asset prices have been considered by some as 
a separate determinant of interest rates while others have argued against the notion that a 
central  bank  might indirectly react to such variables. For example, Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999) make the case against including a reaction to asset prices whereas Cecchetti et al. 
(2000) argue in favor of adding equity returns to a standard Taylor rule. Filardo (2004) points 
out that if non-fundamental asset price movements can have real economic effects, then they 
should be incorporated into the central bank’s policy rule. 
Since the debate partly centers on the information content of asset prices for the future 
course of the economy, this paper tackles the issue from a different angle.
7 There is little 
doubt that central bankers monitor asset price developments, though it is unclear whether this 
is a long standing practice or a more recent development. It is also debatable whether some 
asset prices (e.g., exchange rates) attract more attention than others (e.g., equity or housing 
prices) from the monetary authorities. In any event, as argued by Clarida (2001, p. 318), the 
guiding  principle  implicit  in  the  forward-looking  Taylor  rule  concept,  is  that  “…central 
banks look at everything but only to the extent that “everything” is useful in forecasting 
inflation and possibly output.” 
                                                 
6 While part of the debate has turned on whether the monetary authority should target asset 
price developments, central banks have argued against this position because they treat asset 
prices as forward-looking indicators of inflation and/or the output gap. 
7 Still  another  alternative,  not  considered  in  this  paper,  is  to  broaden  the  definition  of 
inflation. Goodhart (2001), for example, advocates a measure of inflation that goes beyond 
merely incorporating the effects of changing prices for goods and services to also include the 
impact of equity and housing prices.   8
Since asset prices are obvious candidates for addressing this issue we examine their role 
as instruments for inflation and the output gap in forward-looking Taylor rules. For most 
euro  area  economies  one  might  well  argue  that  policy  makers  have  undoubtedly  been 
concerned with real exchange rate movements (Leitemo 1999, Leitemo and Røisland 1999, 
Medina and Valdés 2002). In the past several years, however, attention has turned to the 
behavior  of  equity,  housing,  or  some  other  asset  price  indicators,  as  central  banks  are 
increasingly seen as having to stem the cycle of booms and busts in asset prices. Indeed, 
central banks can be thought of as reacting to some weighted average or linear combination 
of asset prices (Smets 1997). 
Financial  innovations  since  the  1980s,  and  the  shift  in  emphasis  in  the  conduct  of 
monetary policy toward reliance on an interest rate instrument, have reduced the predictive 
role  of  monetary  aggregates  for  inflation  in  the  long-run  and  output  in  the  short-run. 
Nevertheless, monetary aggregates play a role in the operational framework of the ECB (see 
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html), and its key progenitor prior to 1999, namely 
the Deutsche Bundesbank. Hence, as did Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), and Gerdesmeier 
and Roffia (2004), we also consider a monetary aggregate. 
Theories that treat asset price movements as indicators of future inflation or economic 
activity have a long tradition but empirical evidence has had a more difficult time reaching 
anything  approaching a  consensus  (Stock  and  Watson  2003, 2007). Even if it is deemed 
desirable to incorporate a role for asset prices, the investigator faces a number of additional 
difficulties. In particular, there is no widespread agreement on how best to define equilibrium 
real exchange rate or asset price levels though these problems seem no less intractable than   9
defining  the  “trend”  in  output  used  in  deriving  an  output  gap  measure.
8  Following  most 
authors, we rely on variations of standard filters to approximate the variables of interest. 
Table 1 presents a selection of published estimates of Taylor rules, primarily for euro 
area countries. Only estimates of forward-looking and forecast-based reaction functions are 
shown though several backward-looking Taylor rule estimates have also been published. The 
steady-state estimates for inflation tend to be consistent with the Taylor principle, according 
to which a larger than unit nominal interest rate response is required for any unit increase in 
inflation. Table 1 also reveals considerable variation in the estimated weights on the inflation 
and  output  gap  objectives,  the  role of  asset  prices  is  usually not  investigated,  nor  is  the 
robustness  of  results  or  the  relative  suitability  of  forward-  or  forecast-based  models 
extensively analyzed.
9 
Table 1 about here 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) examine how stock prices affect interest rate determination 
in the U.S. and Japan. Cecchetti (2003) also reports that the Fed reacted to stock market 
developments relying again on a Taylor rule. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) add a real 
exchange rate, as do Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2004), with mixed results at best. While a real 
exchange  rate  variable  in  a  Taylor  rule  can  be  statistically  significant,  it  is  generally 
economically  small  (also  see  Taylor  2001,  and  Leitemo  and  Söderström  2001).  Indeed, 
                                                 
8 In  the  case  of  equity  and  possibly  housing  prices,  matters  are  complicated  still  further 
because there is possibly an element of “irrational exuberance” or a “bubble” component that 
is difficult to measure empirically. This paper does not address all of these issues. 
9 Gerdesmeier  and  Roffia  (2004)  perform  an  extensive  comparison  of  forward-  versus 
backward-looking Taylor rules for the euro area.   10
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) argue that closed and open economy policy rules ought to 
be qualitatively the same (also see Clarida 2001). 
3. Estimation and Testing Strategy 
We begin with a standard version of Taylor’s rule: 
t t t y t t i y i i u r g p gp + + + + = -1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  (1) 
where  t i  is the nominal interest rate instrument of monetary policy,  a r) 1 ( - = i  the sum of 
the steady-state real interest rate and the annual inflation target (also see equation (2) below), 
p ~ and  y ~ denote, respectively, the inflation and output gap,  r  is the interest rate persistence 
or  smoothing  term,  and  t u   denotes  a  residual  term.  The  inflation  gap  is  the  difference 
between  expected  and  targeted  inflation  rates, 
* ) ( p p - + j t t E .  The  output  gap  is  the 
percentage deviation of real GDP from its potential level.  b r gp ) 1 ( ~ - =  and  q r g ) 1 ( ~ - = y  
are  weights  policy makers  place on inflation and output gap objectives while the central 
bank’s  steady-state  reactions  are  captured  via  estimates  of  b   and  q ,  respectively.
10 
Therefore, the interest rate target is: 
) ~ ( ) ~ ( *
k t t n j t t n t y E E i + + + + = q p b a ,  (2) 
                                                 
10 In an optimizing framework (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000), these weights also reflect to 
some extent the underlying structure of the economy and the persistence of economic shocks.   11
where  ) ~ ( j t t E + p  and  ) ~ ( k t t y E +  are the conditional expectations of inflation and the output 
gap,  j  or k  periods ahead,  0 , ³ k j .
11 
Since  ) ~ ( j t t E + p   and  ) ~ ( k t t y E +   are  unobservable,  proxies  must  be  used.  The  standard 
practice is to resort to instrumental variable estimation. Alternatively, the central bank could 
be viewed as setting monetary policy on the basis of inflation and output growth forecasts. 
Since internal central bank forecasts are unavailable, we rely on public and private sector 
forecasts as proxies.




t n t y
f
t n t t i y i i u r g p gp + + + + = - + + 1 ,
* ~ ,
* ~ ~ ~ ,  (1a) 
where 
f
t n t ,
~
+ p  and 
f
t n t y ,
~
+  are, respectively, published forecasts of inflation (or the inflation 
gap) and the output gap n periods ahead made at time t .
13 
                                                 
11 In  equation  (2)  the  inflation  target  has  been  normalized  to  zero.  Equation  (1)  is  then 
derived from the relation  t t t t i i i u r r + - + = -
*
1 ) 1 ( . Moreover, while there is no requirement 
that  k j = , this is the general practice followed in empirical work. 
12 Goodhart (2005), Jansson and Vredin (2003), Siklos (2002), and Siklos and Wohar (2006) 
also estimate policy rules relying on central bank forecasts. 
13 Siklos, Werner, and Bohl (2004) consider the estimation of extended Taylor rules with 
asset prices as a separate determinant of nominal interest rates. In this paper we do not follow 
this estimation strategy primarily because, according to many central bankers, asset prices are 
best thought of as indicators of future inflation or output rather than variables they might 
directly target. They also consider the implications for Taylor rules using real-time data for   12
A difficulty with forecasts is, first, that it is not immediately clear whether the published 
forecasts are based on the assumption that interest rates are unchanged.
14 Second, depending 
on  the  source  of  the  forecast,  updating  is  done  at  different  intervals,  namely  monthly, 
quarterly,  or  even  semi-annually.  Third,  forecasts  are  for  inflation  (or  real  GDP  growth) 
covering a calendar year. Yet it is conceivable that, as the forecast period approaches, the 
arrival of additional data are used to change forecasts. As a result, we assume that the data 
available to the forecaster is augmented as far as possible to reflect the data that would be 
used  to  generate  inflation  and  real  GDP  growth  forecasts  for  the  relevant  calendar  year. 
Clearly, we do not know exactly the information set used by the various forecasters. Hence, 
our attempt to control for the changing span of time between the forecast period and the data 
that would be available in generating the forecast is only an approximation. 
There is an additional issue that arises in the estimation of forecast-based Taylor rules 
(and, to some extent, forward-looking Taylor rules). The available span of data is relatively 
                                                                                                                                                       
Germany and the euro area, as opposed to the revised data as done in the present study. 
Unfortunately, real-time  data  for France and Italy are not of the same caliber as what is 
available for Germany and the euro area. Hence, we do not address the relevant issues any 
further  in  what  follows.  See,  however,  Eleftheriou,  Gerdesmeier,  and  Roffia  (2006)  for 
empirical evidence dealing with some of the relevant issues for the pre-euro era.    
14 Fuhrer and Tootell (2004) point out that if the correlation between the contemporaneous 
asset price and lagged interest rate changes is significant, this will tend to bias the coefficient 
on the asset price variable in the estimated policy rule away from zero. Goodhart (2005) 
shows for UK data that using forecasts conditioned on known interest rate decisions, results 
in a potentially serious misspecification.   13
short  and  covers  a  period  when  interest  rates  were  falling.  Furthermore,  measurement 
problems  concerning  the  output  gap,  for  example,  may  be  exacerbated  in  forecast-based 
Taylor rules since with one exception we rely on forecasts of real GDP growth and not those 
of the output gap. As Walsh (2003) and others have noted, first differencing of such time 
series  mitigates  the  problem.  Consequently,  estimates  of  forecast-based  Taylor  rules  are 
provided for a version of (1a) in first differences: 
t t
f
t n t y
f
t n t t i y i x D r D g p D g D D p D + + + = - + + 1 ,
*~ ,
* ~ ~ ~ ,  (1b) 
where all the variables have been defined, D is the difference operator, and  t x  is the residual 
of the forecast-based Taylor rule in first differences.
15 
As noted previously, there is some evidence about the desirability of incorporating a mix 
of forward- or even forecast-based elements. Goodhart (2005, p. 1) points out that while the 
past history of output and inflation may be important determinants of the future course of 
these variables, “…they will surely never be the only determinants of those forecasts” [italics 
in  original].  One  way  of  evaluating  the  relative  contributions  of  forward-looking  versus 
forecast-based Taylor rules, not heretofore considered elsewhere, is to ask whether one type 
of reaction function statistically encompasses the other. In this fashion, we test whether it 
might be preferable to estimate such rules as linear combinations of each other. 
                                                 
15 It is conceivable that nominal interest rates have a unit root. Siklos and Wohar (2006) 
consider the implications for estimating Taylor rules. The unit root property suggests the 
possibility of cointegration but no such property was found in the data, again likely because 
of the span of the sample. Estimates of (1b) include a constant. Variants of (1b) were also 
estimated with lags of various asset prices. See the discussion in the next section.   14
Next, the question arises how to proxy the inflation target. Usually, the inflation target is 
assumed to be a constant (say 2%). Since our conclusions were unaffected by the type of 
inflation  gap  proxy  used,  we  only  report  results  which  assume  a  constant  inflation 
objective.
16 This has the slight advantage of allowing for a comparison with the bulk of the 
literature on Taylor rules. Similarly, estimation of the output gap has been problematic. As 
with the inflation gap, we utilize an HP filter and various standard detrending schemes, as 
there are no practical alternatives for the output gap for the countries in our sample.
17 
Following much of the empirical literature we estimate (1), and its variants, via GMM, in 
spite of questions about its reliability (e.g., Mavroeidis 2004, Jondeau, Le Bihan, and Galles 
2004).  A  crucial  issue  concerns  the  choice  of  instruments  and,  more  importantly,  their 
                                                 
16 We  used  an  HP filter  with  a  standard smoothing  parameter (1600) as well as a larger 
smoothing parameter (4800). In addition, we also estimated an inflation target evaluated as 
the  mid-point  of  the  spread  between  the  average  annual  inflation  rate  in  the  euro  area 
countries and the average annual inflation rate in the three lowest inflation rate countries in 
the euro area plus 1.5%, as specified in the Maastricht Treaty. The conclusions are robust to 
all these alternatives. 
17 Stock and Watson (2003) recommend a one-sided HP filter. Much of the literature uses a 
two-sided HP filter for convenience, or an alternative measure of the economy’s capacity, but 
comparable time series are not available for the vast majority of euro area countries. We also 
generate, but do not report here, estimates of the output gap based on a Blanchard-Quah type 
decomposition with no impact on our conclusions.   15
relevance.  Typically,  the  J-test  for  goodness  of  fit  is  reported  without  much  comment.
18 
Nevertheless, focusing on such a test alone also poses problems because one risks choosing a 
model with theoretically implausible coefficients in the rule. Therefore, we augment the tests 
for over-identifying restrictions by reporting Andrews’ (1999) GMM information criterion. 
This test indicates whether the chosen instruments are orthogonal to the error term. Hall and 
Peixe (2003) propose the canonical correlation instrument relevance test (also see Hall 2005). 
We also consider a test for instrument relevance based on two stage least squares (TSLS). 
Shea  (1997)  points  out  that  regressing  the  endogenous  variables  against  the  chosen 
instruments can be misleading if there is more than one endogenous variable in the estimated 
specification. Jondeau, Le Bihan, and Galles (2004) report simulation evidence suggesting 
even small mis-specifications can lead to implausibly large coefficients for forward-looking 
variables estimated via GMM. Godfrey (1999) develops a simple measure for computing 
instrument relevance based on a TSLS estimation specification.
19 With this in mind, we use 
                                                 
18 Some authors rely on the J-test to determine the horizon used by the policy makers. As we 
shall see, it is difficult to reject the null of the validity of chosen instrument sets and difficult 
to discriminate among competing versions of the same estimated policy rule. 
19 While the test for instrument relevance is based on TSLS it has the advantage that it can 
accommodate more than one endogenous variable and does not rely on GMM. Recent tests 
for  instrument  relevance  are  more  complex  when  there  is  more  than  one  endogenous 
variable.  Jim  Stock’s  weak  instruments  web  page  updates  information  on  this  topic 
(ksghome.harvard.edu/~jstock/ams/websupp/index.htm).   16
asset prices, among other variables, as instruments and test both their impact on the fit of 
estimated policy rules, as well as their relevance as instruments.
20 
Once the reaction functions are estimated we can back-out the implied target interest 
rates 
*
t i  over time to determine how well a reaction function fits with actual interest rate 
developments  in  the  individual  countries  considered.  Finally,  we  report  statistical 
encompassing  tests  to  determine  which  of  the  two  kinds  of  reaction  functions,  if  any, 
provides the best fit overall (Chong and Hendry 1986). 
4. Data and Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Data and Preliminaries 
Data  are  quarterly  at  the  source,  or  converted  to  the  quarterly  frequency  by  taking 
monthly averages where necessary. For real GDP, seasonally unadjusted data were used and 
adjustment was made using X-11. To generate the output gap we use the HP filter (also see 
footnote 16, 17). For the euro area we rely on estimates of the output gap used in the euro 
                                                 
20 An objection that can be raised is that GMM is a non-linear estimation technique while the 
tests of instrument relevance used here are based on TSLS estimates. Since GMM is the 
estimation  technique  of  choice  we  retain  its  use.  Furthermore,  relying  on  other  tests  of 
instrument  relevance  (e.g.,  the  F-test  as  in  Stock,  Wright,  and  Yogo  2002)  we  obtain 
comparable  results.  Gerdesmeier  and  Roffia  (2004)  report  few  substantive  differences 
between their GMM and TSLS estimates for the euro area. We also consider whether the 
volatility of asset prices serve as superior instruments in forward-looking rules (results not 
shown). Our conclusions are unchanged.   17
area-wide model.
21 Information about the construction of euro area wide data is available 
from  the  ECB  (www.ecb.int),  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (http://dsbb.imf.org/ 
Applications/web/euronote/).  Anderson  et  al.  (2006)  also  explain  and  criticize  the 
construction of historical euro area-wide data. 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) made available its aggregate asset price 
index. Therefore, we can get some idea of the potential impact of relying on a weighted 
average of key asset prices.
22 The individual asset prices we consider are housing prices, 
equity  prices,  the  real  exchange  rate,  a  measure  of  financial  conditions  proxied  by  the 
financial conditions index,
23 and a broad monetary aggregate. For the euro area, as there were 
no financial conditions index weights, we used instead a measure of wealth available from 
the Euro Area Business Cycle Network. We also consider an “all asset prices” case. This 
means that a monetary aggregate, equity returns, the real exchange rate, and housing prices 
enter jointly. Next, we transform all variables, except the nominal interest rate, measured in 
                                                 
21 Data  were  obtained  from  the  Bank  of  Finland.  However,  members  of  the  Euro  Area 
Business Cycle Network at www.eabcn.org may also access the relevant time series. 
22 The empirical results rely on the nominal measure. The BIS asset price index is essentially 
a weighted average of equity, residential and commercial property prices, where the weights 
are their respective shares in private sector wealth. The calibration of weights has changed 
over time (Borio and Lowe 2002, Borio, Kennedy, and Prowse 1994). 
23 The estimated weights reported in Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) are used. The financial 
conditions  index  can  be  thought  of  as  an  extension  of  the  monetary  conditions  index, 
representing a linear combination of interest rates and exchange rates, to include housing and 
equity prices.   18
percent, into 100 times the fourth order log difference, i.e.,  ) log (log 4 - - t t X X , where  X  is 
the variable of interest. 
Turning  to  forecast-based  Taylor  rules,  these  rely  on  one  year-ahead  forecasts  of 
inflation,  real  GDP  growth,  or  the  output  gap.  The  relevant  data  were  obtained  from 
Consensus  Economics,  The  Economist,  and  the  OECD.  The  first  two  are  private  sector 
forecasts while the OECD is a public agency supported by several governments. Consensus 
and  Economist  forecasts  are  monthly  and  were  converted  to  the  quarterly  frequency  via 
simple  averaging.  OECD  forecasts  are  semi-annual  and  linear  interpolation  was  used  to 
generate quarterly forecasts. Forecasts are for the CPI or the HCPI, in the case of the euro 
area,  and  real  GDP  growth  except  OECD  forecasts  where  output  gap  forecasts  were 
employed. 
Figure 1 plots estimated gaps in housing prices, equity prices and in the BIS’s aggregate 
asset price index based on different filtering techniques. To gain additional perspective, the 
gaps  are  shown alongside  periods  of “booms and bust” cycles, as defined by Bordo and 
Jeanne (2004) as well as Detken and Smets (2004), and dated using a type of moving average 
of the relevant asset price shown. There appear to be few differences between HP filtering 
and  quadratic  or  cubic  de-trending,  the  most  commonly  used  techniques  in  this  context, 
though  the  amplitudes  are  larger  when  de-trending  is  used  or  when  a  larger  smoothing 
parameter is chosen for the HP filter. No “bust” period in equity prices were identified by 
Bordo and Jeanne (2004) for Germany and France, at least for the period covered here. Yet, 
both HP filtering as well as cubic detrending reveal substantial stock price declines on more 
than one occasion. For Italy, the two bust periods identified by Bordo and Jeanne (2004)   19
appear broadly consistent with either filter used. However, in this setup, comparable price 
declines at the beginning of the sample and during the later 1990s did not make the grade. 
Figure 1 about here 
Turning to housing prices (middle panel in Figure 1), downturns identified via various 
filters broadly match those reported in Bordo and Jeanne (2004) but only one boom period 
shown here across the three countries considered. Finally, when we use the BIS’s nominal 
aggregate asset price index, and compare its behavior with the so-called high and low cost 
booms reported in Detken and Smets (2004), we find general agreement with the application 
of an HP filter to the data. 
Gaps  in  the  BIS’s  aggregate  asset  price  index  (bottom  of  Figure  1)  reveal  some 
differences relative to gaps in housing and equity prices. For example, for France, there are 
two large positive gaps in asset prices around 1990, and then again in 2000/2001, which are 
not entirely mirrored in the other asset price movements depicted in the same figure. Much 
the same can be said for the development of asset prices in Germany and Italy. While our 
results could be sensitive to the choice of filters, the empirical evidence shown below relies 
on the standard menu of detrending filters used in the available literature. 
Using published forecasts in a forecast-based Taylor rule may be misleading if forecasts 
are inefficient or unbiased (Fuhrer and Tootell 2004). A simple test of forecast efficiency 










2 1 0 ,  (3) 
where  j t z +  is inflation or the output gap, 
f
j t z +  are the forecasts from Consensus Economics, 
The Economist, and the OECD Economic Outlook. Forecasts are generally for four and eight   20
quarters  8 , 4 = j .  k t x -  includes the BIS aggregate asset price index, the rate of change in 
housing prices, equity prices, or the real exchange rate, where  k  is set either to 1 or 4. 
Forecast efficiency implies that the forecasts are not influenced by lags of some, or all, asset 
prices, i.e., the non-rejection of the null hypothesis  0 2 = k d , for all  n k ,..., 1 = . Unbiasedness 
requires not only forecast efficiency, but the non-rejection of the joint null  0 0 = d ,  1 1 = d . 
Estimation results (not shown but available on request) reveal that, for inflation, neither 
lags in the BIS index nor housing prices improve the explanatory power of equation (3). The 
results  are  somewhat  more  mixed  for  the  equity  and  real  exchange  rate  variables.  For 
example,  The  Economist’s  forecasts  for  inflation  in  France  and  Italy  appear  inefficient. 
Otherwise all other forecasts are efficient. When all asset prices are considered jointly, only 
OECD forecasts display some inefficiency. Turning to the output gap, there is almost no 
evidence of forecast inefficiency regardless of the source of the forecast.
24 Our findings show 
strong  evidence  of  forecast  efficiency  for  the  BIS  index  and  when  all  asset  prices  enter 
equation (3) jointly. The available forecasts do, however, appear to be unbiased. 
Equation (3) is the usual test of forecast efficiency. Filardo (2004) suggests that, lagged 
forecasts should also be insignificantly related to  t z . When we re-estimate (3) adding lags of 
f
t z  the results (not shown but available on request) are mixed. Therefore, conditional on 
k t x - , at least some forecasts of  j t z +  could be improved by the addition of the past history of 
                                                 
24 Other than for the OECD, where forecasts of the output gap are available, forecasts are for 
real GDP growth. Whether (3) uses GDP growth or a proxy for the output gap does not 
change the outcome of the forecast efficiency tests.   21
t z .  Since  k t x -   consists  of  asset  prices  alone,  this  is  suggestive  of  a  non-fundamental 
component. We leave the implications of this result for future research. 
4.2 Instrument Selection and Relevance 
Panel A of Table 2 shows J-test statistics for the non-rejection rates for the null that the 
over-identifying restrictions are acceptable. Since it is unclear how forward-looking central 
banks  are,  equation  (2)  is  estimated  for  8 ,..., 0 , = k j .  Examining  the  results  for  France, 
Germany,  and  Italy,  it  is  difficult  to  discriminate  among  the  different  combinations  of 
horizons  in  spite  of  the  relatively  large  number  of  instrument  sets  considered  and  the 
inclusion of a wide variety of asset prices as instruments. Interestingly, the situation changes 
dramatically  when  euro  area-wide  data  are  considered.  While  the  non-rejection  rates  are 
modest at short horizons, the J-test rejects the over-identifying restrictions at horizons of a 
year or longer. 
Table 2 about here 
Panel B of Table 2 considers Andrews’ (1999) GMM information criterion. To conserve 
space,  results  are  shown  only  for the  cases  where inflation  and  the output gap enter the 
forward-looking Taylor rules either contemporaneously or four quarters ahead. Regardless of 
the specification considered the instrument set most orthogonal to the error term consists of a 
combination of individual asset prices, namely the real exchange rate, housing prices, and 
equity returns. Nevertheless, if an investigator were to choose a common asset price for all 
cases considered, a monetary aggregate is a fairly good choice most of the time. 
As argued in Hall and Peixe (2003), Andrews’ (1999) test represents a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for determining the suitability of the chosen instrument set. Panel C of 
Table  2  shows  their  canonical  correlation  test  of  instrument  relevance.  The  conclusions   22
reached earlier are generally unchanged. However, it is interesting to note that if a more 
parsimonious  instrument  set  is  desired,  the  BIS  asset  price  index  would  be  chosen  for 
Germany and the euro area while housing price inflation, or a monetary aggregate, would be 
good choices for France and Italy. 
4.3 Steady-State Taylor Rule Coefficient Estimates and the Role of Asset Prices 
Table 3 presents estimates of the steady-state parameters in forward-looking Taylor rules 
for a variety of instrument sets. Previous instrument tests were based on GMM estimation 
and these are known to be sensitive to the chosen specification. Accordingly, we supplement 
GMM-based  tests  with  instrument  relevance  tests  based  on  TSLS  estimates  of  (2). 
Additionally, we show the root mean squared error (RMSE) for the difference between actual 
and implied nominal interest rates for each specification of equation (2). 
Table 3 about here 
Generally,  the  various  diagnostic  tests  find  evidence  in  favor  of  the  instrument  set 
consisting of a combination of individual asset prices. This result certainly fits well with the 
notion that central banks take into account a variety of indicators when setting the instrument 
of monetary policy. Not surprisingly perhaps, the real exchange rate is a close second, at least 
based on the RMSE criterion. 
The  impact  of  using  different  instrument  sets  is  clearly  seen  from  the  steady-state 
parameter estimates on the inflation and output gap variables. The coefficients on inflation 
range from 0.94 to 1.93 across the three countries considered, with responses smallest for 
France and largest for Germany. Indeed, for Germany and Italy, the responses are typically 
significantly above one, as required by the Taylor principle. Interestingly, if the policy rule is 
chosen on the basis of instrument relevance, the coefficient on inflation is generally smaller   23
than  when  the  standard  set  of  instruments  is  used.  This  could  mean  that  asset  price 
developments led some central banks to respond more cautiously. These estimates are also 
well within the range of earlier published results, as can be seen by comparing our estimates 
with those shown in Table 1. Finally, the estimates also convey the notion that the core euro 
area members may well have responded differently to inflation over the sample considered. 
Turning to the output gap, the steady-state coefficients are generally insignificant, at least 
if a 5% critical value is adopted, but become positive and statistically significant when the 
instrument set is one of the preferred ones, based on the various diagnostic tests previously 
considered. The significance of the output gap is clearly a function of instrument choice. 
Estimates for the euro area shown in Table 4. The most striking result is the difference 
between estimates that alternatively include and exclude the era since the ECB took over sole 
responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy. Based on full sample estimates, the ECB 
appears to react more aggressively to inflation and the output gap than for a sample that ends 
in  1998.  When  the  standard  set  of  instruments  is  used,  the  ECB  appears  to  react  less 
aggressively to the output gap for the full sample compared to the short sample. In contrast, 
the ECB reacts positively and significantly to the output gap, and somewhat less aggressively 
to  inflation,  when  different  asset  prices  enter  as  instruments.  Nevertheless,  based  on  the 
additional instrument relevance tests, and the RMSE criterion, that either a euro area-wide 
wealth  measure  or  the  money gap,  are the additional instruments that appear to improve 
estimates  of  the  policy  rule.  Table  4  also  highlights  instances  where the  coefficients  are 
jointly  statistically  different  for  the  two  periods.  Forward-looking  Taylor  rules  are 
significantly different in the 1978 - 2003 sample relative to the pre-EMU sample in every   24
case except when wealth is used as an instrument. Hence, there is considerable evidence of a 
change in the policy response since the start of EMU. 
Table 4 about here 
Table  5  presents  RMSE  estimates  for  the  forecast-based  Taylor  rule  (1b)  in  first 
differences.  The  results  are  clear-cut.  Paralleling  the  findings  for  forward-looking  Taylor 
rules, specifications that rely on one year forecasts of the output gap and inflation, and are 
augmented by lags in a combination of the four asset prices considered, provide the best 
overall  fit  among  the  various  specifications.  Furthermore,  Consensus  one  year  forecasts 
outperform  slightly  those  based  on  The  Economist  while  OECD  forecasts,  which  are 
published only semi-annually, perform most poorly of all. Lastly, there is little deterioration 
in  the  in-sample  forecasting  performance  between  one  and  two  year-ahead  Consensus 
forecasts. The latter is typically the horizon mentioned by central banks when deciding the 
appropriate stance for monetary policy. 
Table 5 about here 
To gauge the comparative advantage of one type of policy rule over another, Table 6 
presents encompassing tests that rely on the best performing forward-looking and forecast-
based policy rule estimates.
25 At the 5% level of significance, the results reveal a clear-cut 
preference  for  forecast-based  over  forward-looking  Taylor  rules.  Of  course,  one  must  be 
mindful of the potential information advantage embedded into the published forecasts. In a 
sense the encompassing test confirms this result. It is tempting, therefore, to conclude overall 
in favor of the forecast-based Taylor rule as the preferred specification. However, as we 
know relatively little about the model or methods used to generate the published forecast, it is 
                                                 
25 Sample begins in 1991 (1996 for the euro area) due to data limitations in the forecast data.   25
too early to reach a definitive conclusion on this score. Nevertheless, the performance of 
forecast-based Taylor rules, and existing evidence suggesting that central bank forecasts may 
be superior to private sector forecasts (e.g, see Romer and Romer 2000), suggests that more 
central banks ought to release their own forecasts and inform the public about the basis upon 
which these are generated. 
Table 6 about here 
5. Conclusions 
It is commonplace to estimate forward-looking policy rules. Relatively little effort has 
been devoted to ascertaining the performance and relevance of different instrument sets used 
in generating a central bank’s response to inflation and the output gap. Instrument relevance 
tests suggest that asset prices, typically a combination that includes a real exchange rate, 
equity  returns,  and  housing  prices,  are  part  of  the  information  set  used  by  the  ECB  in 
determining the responses to inflation and the output gap in the euro area. 
More importantly, the choice of instruments has a significant impact on the steady-state 
response of central banks to inflation and the output gap. Any improvements in estimating 
forward-looking  Taylor  rules  must  confront  the  fact  that  forecast-based  rules  typically 
outperform them. Whether this result is partly, or largely, due to the possibility that some 
forecasts incorporate the effects of changes in the stance of monetary policy is unclear but 
clearly warrants additional research. Indeed, if our findings hold up, a policy implication is 
that central banks ought to be encouraged to release their own forecasts.   26
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Table 1: Selected Estimates of Taylor Rule Parameters 
 
Steady-State Coefficient Estimates  Author 
Inflation  Output Gap  Other Variables 
Countries, Sample 
Forward-Looking Taylor Rules 
Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999) 
1.12 - 2.21 
1.60 - 1.71 
0.20 - 0.33 
0.14 - 0.20 
0.19 - 0.29 
-0.08 
Japan, 1968 - 1989 




1.69 - 2.39 
0.98 - 1.46 
1.10 - 2.37 
-0.72 - 1.07 
-0.61 - 0.60 
-0.02 - 0.05 
0.07 - 0.02 
0.01 - 0.89 
0.02 - 0.002
 
U.S., 1979 - 2000 
U.K., 1979 - 2000 




1.10 - 1.37 
1.81 - 2.04 
1.05 - 2.20 
0.48 - 0.98 
0.59 - 1.33 
0.59 - 0.91 
0.25 - 0.35 
0.03 - 0.10 
0.14 - 0.52 
0.17 - 0.28 
-0.07 - 0.88 
-0.03 - 0.22 
0.05 - 0.12 
0.06 - 0.09 




Germany, 1979 - 1989 
Japan, 1979 - 1989 
U.S., 1979 - 1989 
U.K., 1979 - 1989 
France, 1979 - 1989 












France, 1979 - 1996 
Germany, 1979 - 1996 
















Euro area, 1985 - 2002 
Gerlach and 
Schnabel (2000) 
0.98 - 1.62  0.22 - 0.32  -0.03 - (-0.56)  Euro 11, 1990 - 1998 
Gerlach-Kristen 
(2003) 




1.25  0.32  n.a.  Germany, 1990 - 1998 




2.13  0.13  n.a.  Sweden, 1994 - 2001 
Kuttner (2004)
  2.83  1.35  n.a.  Sweden, 1994 - 2003 
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Table 2: Testing Over-Identifying Restrictions 
  France  Germany  Italy  Euro Area 
Panel A: Rejection Frequencies 




8 ,..., 0 , 0 = = k j   25.4  23.8  19.0  47.6  41.2 
0 , 8 ,..., 0 = = k j   23.8  22.2  25.4  36.5  41.3 
3 , = k j   71.4  28.6  42.9  57.1  100.0 
4 , = k j   14.3  14.3  28.6  85.7  100.0 
5 , = k j   14.3  28.6  14.3  100.0  100.0 
Panel B: GMM Information Criterion 
Instrument Set  0 = k  
  0 = j   4 = j   0 = j   4 = j   0 = j   4 = j   0 = j   4 = j  
All Asset Prices  -100.9  -99.1  -99.7  -99.7  -98.0  -97.7  -100.4  -101.0 
BIS Index  -67.3  -66.7  -63.8  -64.9  -66.7  -63.2  -70.1  -70.0 
Equity Prices  -66.9  -65.5  -69.5  -67.1  -68.2  -65.8  -67.2  -68.8 
FCI/Wealth  -67.7  -68.7  -64.8  -65.2  -65.4  -65.3  -69.5  -70.3 
Housing Prices  -68.1  -67.7  -65.2  -65.9  -65.8  -64.5  n.a.  n.a. 
RER  -66.0  -68.4  -65.6  -67.0  -67.4  -66.3  -65.2  -68.7 
Money  -68.1  -67.3  -65.7  -65.1  -69.3  -66.6  -65.1  -66.0 
Standard  -51.3  -51.3  -48.7  -51.8  -52.6  -50.8  -54.4  -55.0 
  4 , = k j  
All Asset Prices  -100.0  -99.0  -97.8  -104.4 
BIS Index  -67.8  -64.7  -62.9  -72.8 
Equity Prices  -67.5  -66.4  -65.9  -71.2 
FCI/Wealth  -66.9  -64.6  -66.6  -73.1 
Housing Prices  -67.9  -64.4  -64.9  n.a. 
RER  -66.2  -67.2  -67.4  -69.5 
Money  -66.1  -67.2  -67.4  -68.7 
Standard  -50.3  -50.8  -51.2  -54.8 
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Table 2 (Continued): Testing Over-Identifying Restrictions 
Instrument Set  France  Germany  Italy  Euro Area 
Panel C: Canonical Correlation Information Criterion 
All Asset Prices  -95.14  -94.96  -93.76  -110.98 
BIS Index  -60.38  -60.27  -59.51  -77.72 
Equity Prices  -60.35  -60.22  -59.53  -76.71 
FCI/Wealth  -60.39  -60.22  -59.50  -74.52 
Housing Prices  -60.42  -60.22  -59.53  n.a. 
RER  -60.40  -60.23  -59.50  -76.73 
Money  -60.36  -59.60  -59.54  -75.17 
Standard  -60.35  -60.17  -59.50  -61.78 
Note:  j   and  k   denote  the  number  of  quarters  ahead  in  inflation  and  the  output  gap, 
respectively, as specified in equation (2). All Asset Prices means that a monetary aggregate, 
equity returns, the real exchange rate, and housing prices enter jointly. BIS Index denotes the 
aggregate asset price index provided by the BIS, FCI the financial conditions index, RER the 
real exchange rate, and Money a monetary aggregate. Standard refers to the Taylor rule (2) 
with a conventional instrument set consisting of a constant, 3 lags of the interest rate, 4 lags of 
inflation and the output gap, and 4 lags of the rate of change of oil prices. All other variables 
have been previously defined. Due to data availability a wealth measure is used for the euro 
area and the FCI for the individual countries. The frequencies in panel A refer to the fraction 
of times the null hypothesis of a valid over-identifying restriction cannot be accepted at the 
5% level. For France, Germany and Italy all results are for the sample 1978 - 1998. All data 
are quarterly.   36
Table 3: Steady-State Coefficient Estimates of Taylor Rules 
and Additional Instrument Relevance Tests for the Individual Countries 
 
F-test 
Instrument Set  b   q   r   2 ~ p R  
2 ~ y R   RMSE  p ~   y ~ 
France   
All Asset Prices  1.12 (0.52)  3.88 (0.01)  0.89  0.60  0.97  0.97  294  5.40 
BIS Index  0.97 (0.88)  2.50 (0.17)  0.90  0.70  0.26  0.99  292  4.06 
Equity Prices  0.98 (0.93)  -1.43 (0.54)  0.87  0.51  0.07  1.00  279  4.29 
FCI  1.09 (0.00)  2.15 (0.19)  0.90  0.73  0.21  0.95  266  5.89 
Housing Prices  1.04 (0.91)  7.30 (0.24)  0.92  0.03  0.43  1.07  365  1.62 
RER  1.02 (0.00)  1.14 (0.28)  0.88  0.81  0.34  0.95  277  6.60 
Money  1.47 (0.30)  0.95 (0.17)  0.86  0.12  0.42  0.54  233  4.28 
Standard  0.94 (0.76)  -0.36 (0.91)  0.87  0.45  0.05  0.99  360  5.15 
Germany 
All Asset Prices  1.52 (0.01)  1.36 (0.00)  0.89  0.99  0.94  0.52  32.33  4.84 
BIS Index  1.89 (0.00)  0.39 (0.29)  0.85  0.46  0.45  0.58  38.44  6.92 
Equity Prices  1.84 (0.01)  1.44 (0.00)  0.88  0.49  0.36  0.59  43.90  6.59 
FCI  1.83 (0.00)  0.41 (0.11)  0.78  0.43  0.45  0.60  35.70  6.36 
Housing Prices  1.93 (0.00)  0.89 (0.03)  0.86  0.02  0.63  0.59  38.27  2.96 
RER  1.43 (0.00)  1.03 (0.00)  0.88  0.95  0.49  0.51  41.81  5.88 
Money  1.13 (0.78)  3.99 (0.52)  0.91  0.26  0.26  0.94  36.17  8.23 
Standard  1.93 (0.00)  0.69 (0.10)  0.85  0.35  0.30  0.59  50.31  7.58 
Italy 
All Asset Prices  1.25 (0.01)  1.04 (0.05)  0.81  0.18  0.56  0.94  228  3.41 
BIS Index  1.37 (0.04)  2.21 (0.11)  0.81  0.14  0.26  1.01  251  4.84 
Equity Prices  1.45 (0.06)  3.15 (0.09)  0.85  0.12  0.16  1.02  266  4.90 
FCI  1.38 (0.00)  2.15 (0.02)  0.82  0.15  0.36  1.00  289  4.87 
Housing Prices  1.30 (0.02)  1.54 (0.10)  0.80  0.00  0.39  0.98  268  1.94 
RER  1.26 (0.00)  1.10 (0.16)  0.79  0.14  0.37  0.95  298  4.83 
Money  1.64 (0.27)  4.44 (0.38)  0.86  0.44  0.42  1.05  303  5.66 
Standard  1.53 (0.06)  3.85 (0.09)  0.84  0.13  0.18  1.10  336  6.42 
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Table 3 (Continued): Steady-State Coefficient Estimates of Taylor Rules 
and Additional Instrument Relevance Tests for the Individual Countries 
Note: See the note to Table 2 for variable and instrument set definitions. Reported are the 
GMM estimates of steady-state parameters for the case  4 , = k j .  b  is the steady state inflation 
parameter,  q   is  the  steady  state  parameter  on  the  output  gap,  and  r   is  the  interest  rate 
smoothing  parameter.  p-values  are  in  parenthesis  for  the  null  1 = b   (except  for  the  real 
exchange rate and the FCI where the null is  0 = b ) and  0 = q . Wald tests (F-version) that the 
coefficients on lagged values of relevant asset prices are jointly insignificant. An F-statistic of 
at least 10 is normally required to conclude that the instruments are adequate. 
2 ~ p R  and 
2 ~ y R  are 
partial  R-squared  measures  developed  by  Godfrey  (1999).  They  are  calculated  as 
) / )( / (
OLS GMM GMM OLS rsd rsd se se  where se is the standard error estimates for the coefficients 
on  the  endogenous  variables  ) ~ , ~ ( y p ,  and  rsd   is  the  residual  standard  deviation  for  the 
regressions estimated either via OLS or GMM. Partial R-squared need not add up to 1 across 
columns.  Estimates  use  GMM  with  a  Bartlett  kernel,  Newey-West  bandwidth,  and  HAC 
weighting matrix. RMSE denotes root mean squared error. The sample is quarterly and covers 
the 1978 - 1998 period.   38
Table 4: Steady-State Estimates of Taylor Rule 
and Additional Instrument Relevance Tests for the Euro Area 
F-tests 
Instrument Set  b   q   r   2 ~ p R  
2 ~ y R   RMSE  p ~   y ~  Equality 
1978 - 1998 
All Asset Prices  1.44 (0.02)  3.72 (0.00)  0.87
  0.34  0.30  0.60  463  6.88   
BIS Index  1.32 (0.19)  2.71 (0.00)  0.89  0.30  0.86  0.55  541  9.71   
Equity Prices  1.42 (0.05)  3.73 (0.00)  0.88  0.16  0.16  0.59  533  7.77   
Wealth  1.26 (0.00)  5.06 (0.07)  0.93  0.47  0.44  0.67  449  11.36   
RER  1.38 (0.00)  3.14 (0.00)  0.87  0.34  0.29  0.58  587  8.23   
Money  -0.03 (0.86)  0.11 (0.77)  0.98  0.34  0.30  0.47  360  10.89   
Standard  1.38 (0.45)  4.97 (0.34)  0.95  0.33  0.17  0.72  534  13.76   
1978 - 2003 
All Asset Prices  1.90 (0.01)
  6.49 (0.01)  0.91  0.40  0.32  0.62  500  9.84  3.12 (0.03) 
BIS Index  1.67 (0.07)
  4.86 (0.03)  0.93  0.28  0.81  0.54  542  13.81  4.26 (0.00) 
Equity Prices  1.90 (0.07)  6.51 (0.09)  0.92  0.14  0.11  0.61  568  11.34  4.51 (0.00) 
Wealth  1.61 (0.00)  8.43 (0.23)  0.95  0.47  0.35  0.67  531  14.90  1.70 (0.16) 
RER  1.78 (0.00)  5.20 (0.01)
  0.90  0.38  0.30  0.59  600  11.64  3.13 (0.02) 
Money  1.20 (0.92)  0.11 (0.64)  0.98  0.49  0.37  0.47  336  17.33  2.71 (0.03) 
Standard  2.28 (0.63)  0.24 (0.63)  0.97  0.31  0.14  0.75  636  18.35  8.93 (0.00) 
Note: See the note to Table 3. Wealth is the deviation of the log of real wealth for the euro area from its HP 
filtered level. Data were obtained from the euro area wide model. The F-test “Equality” investigates the null 
that all coefficients in the Taylor rule are jointly significantly different in the 1978 - 2003 period from the 
1978 - 1998 sample.   39




(one year ahead) 
Consensus 
(two year ahead) 
OECD  Economist 
France 
All Asset Prices  0.59  0.60  0.91  0.58 
BIS Index  0.73  0.78  0.96  0.76 
Equity Prices  0.72  0.77  0.95  0.76 
FCI  0.64  0.68  3.23  0.68 
Housing Prices  0.72  0.76  0.96  0.74 
RER  0.67  0.67  0.98  0.70 
Money  0.70  0.76  3.42  0.73 
Standard  0.75  0.79  0.99  0.78 
Germany 
All Asset Prices  0.21  0.23  0.41  0.19 
BIS Index  0.28  0.31  0.59  0.30 
Equity Prices  0.28  0.32  0.59  0.30 
FCI  0.24  0.30  1.58  0.25 
Housing Prices  0.30  0.31  0.57  0.31 
RER  0.29  0.32  0.48  0.26 
Money  0.26  0.28  1.39  0.27 
Standard  0.32  0.35  0.60  0.33 
Italy 
All Asset Prices  0.87  0.78  0.96  0.80 
BIS Index  1.01  0.85  1.03  1.00 
Equity Prices  0.93  0.82  1.01  0.93 
FCI  1.00  0.87  3.97  0.93 
Housing Prices  1.03  0.88  1.00  0.98 
RER  1.03  0.87  1.02  0.95 
Money  0.98  0.87  4.10  0.94 
Standard  1.04  0.90  1.03  1.01 
Euro Area 
All Asset Prices  n.a.
  0.16  n.a.  n.a. 
BIS Index  0.23  0.21  n.a.  0.24 
Equity Prices  0.15  0.30  n.a.  0.21 
Wealth  0.24  0.29  n.a.  0.29 
Housing Prices  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
RER  0.24  0.24  n.a.  0.23 
Money  0.21  0.66  n.a.  0.32 
Standard  0.38  0.33  n.a.  0.37   40
 
Table 5 (Continued): Root Mean Squared Errors in Forecast-Based Taylor Rules 
Note: The RMSE is based on equation (1b). Asset price variables enter in levels. OECD is 
the one year-ahead forecasts of inflation and the output gap from OECD Economic Outlook 
(insufficient data were available for the euro area). Economist is the one year-ahead forecast 
of inflation and real GDP growth from The Economist. n.a. means insufficient or no data 
available. Also, see the Note to Table 2.   41
Table 6: Encompassing Tests 
 
Country, Sample  Type of Taylor Rule  Test Statistic 





















t t i i i c l l + + = 1 0   where 
f
t i   is  the  implied  interest rate  estimated 
from a forecast-based Taylor rule and  e
t i  is the implied interest rate 
obtained  from  a  forward-looking  Taylor  rule.  The  chosen  forecast-
based  Taylor  rules  are  France,  German,  Italy  (money)  and  the  euro 
area (all  asset prices).  The  chosen forward-looking  Taylor rules are 
France, Germany, Italy, and the euro area (all asset prices). The last 
two columns give the coefficient values and the standard error for the 
null  0 0 = l ,  0 1 = l  in the first row and  1 0 = l ,  0 1 = l  in the second 
row. ** (*) indicates whether the relevant null is rejected at the 1% 
(5%) level. 
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Note: Gaps are log levels of the time series shown less the “equilibrium” proxy, estimated either via an HP 
filter with the smoothing parameter shown in the Figures or quadratic detrending. The shaded areas are 
boom and bust cycles, as reported in Bordo and Jeanne (2004), and Detken and Smets (2004). No cycles in 
equity prices for France and Germany were reported in either study. 